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ABSTRACT
SEPARATION OF SSL PROTOCOL PHASES
ACROSS PROCESS BOUNDARIES
by
Kirthikar Anantharam

Secure Sockets Layer is the de-facto standard used in the industry today for secure
communications through web sites. An SSL connection is established by performing a
Handshake, which is followed by the Record phase. While the SSL Handshake is
computationally intensive and can cause of bottlenecks on an application server, the
Record phase can cause similar bottlenecks while encrypting large volumes of data.
SSL Accelerators have been used to improve the performance of SSL-based
application servers. These devices are expensive, complex to configure and inflexible to
customizations. By separating the SSL Handshake and the Record phases into separate
software processes, high availability and throughput can be achieved using open-source
software and platforms. The delegation of the SSL Record phase to a separate process
by transfer of necessary cryptographic information was achieved. Load tests conducted,
showed gains with the separation of the Handshake and Record phases at nominal data
sizes and the approach provides flexibility for enhancements to be carried out for
performance improvements at higher data sizes.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Virtual Private Network

Securing the network infrastructure of an organization is one of the top priorities for
information technology administrators [1]. One way to make a secure connection into an
organization is through a Virtual Private Network (VPN) [2, 3] over the public Internet.
Users can safely connect into an organization's infrastructure through a VPN service and
get access into personal files, email, databases, etc. with the assurance of no
eavesdropping on the data being accessed through the public Internet [4].
A VPN uses the Internet as its transport mechanism, while maintaining the
security of the data on the VPN [5]. The main benefit of a VPN is the potential for
significant cost savings compared to traditional leased lines or dial up networking.
However, these savings come with a certain amount of risk, particularly when using the
public Internet as the delivery mechanism for VPN data. VPN technology is based on the
idea of tunneling, and is commonly used to describe secure remote access tunnels.
Network tunneling involves establishing and maintaining a logical network connection
(that may contain intermediate hops). Over this connection, packets constructed using a
specific VPN protocol format and encapsulated within some other base or carrier
protocol, are transmitted between a VPN client and a VPN server, and finally, deencapsulated on the receiving side. For Internet-based VPNs, packets in one of several
VPN protocols are encapsulated within IP packets [6]. VPN protocols also support
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authentication and encryption to keep the tunnels secure.
Technologies enabling VPN connectivity include Point-to-Point Tunneling
Protocol (PPTP) [7], Layer Two Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) [8], Internet Protocol
Security (IPSec) [9] and Secure Socket Layer (SSL)/Transport Layer Service (TLS) [10,
11, 12]. PPTP and L2TP exist at the data link layer (Layer Two) of the OSI model, while
IPSec exists at the network layer (Layer Three) of the OSI model.
Typically, IPSec based connectivity solutions are embedded in hardware and/or
custom software and that requires the presence of IPSec compliant hardware/software at
both end-points of the connection. This requirement for IPSec compliance at both endpoints along with its complex setup and management requirements has limited the
widespread adoption of IPSec-based VPN in general.
The Layer 2 Transmission Protocol (L2TP) as documented in RFC 2661 [8] is a
lower level protocol for remote connectivity. Combining PPTP [7] and Layer 2
Forwarding allows secure communications. All Microsoft Windows-based machines are
already equipped with this protocol for establishing secure connections to remote servers.
However, this protocol requires both the client and server to use proprietary software to
enable this forwarding. As a result, the usage of L2TP has also been limited.
SSL-based VPNs, on the other hand, leverage the existing and widely accepted
SSL protocol in standard Web browsers like Internet Explorer or Netscape Navigator.
The VPN connection is established and maintained over secure web connections using
HTTPS [13, 14, 15]. The base protocol for this connection is done through a higher-level
communication protocol (L4/L7) used in applications [16, 17, 18]. In addition, there is no
need for proprietary hardware/software compliance at the communication end-points.
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1.2 SSL VPN
Architecturally and commercially, SSL-based VPN has significant advantages over the
other solutions. Firstly, Web browsers are ubiquitous. There is no need for expensive and
time-consuming conversions and training programs. Secondly, the solution is platform
independent. Anyone with a Web browser can connect securely into a network with little
or no configuration. Thirdly, development and security enhancements automatically
evolve as SSL and browser technologies improve (client side). Lastly, the solution is
inexpensive, since Web browsers with SSL capabilities are freely available.
While the advantages of an SSL-based VPN solution greatly outweigh the
alternatives, this approach is not without its problems, namely performance scalability. At
the core of SSL-based VPN or any SSL-based service is its encryption/decryption
capability [19]. All data traveling through an SSL tunnel will entail substantial encryption
and decryption. During times of high load, a VPN server can potentially end up in a
crippled state. Studies have indicated that even a small number of users generating SSLbased traffic can drop server performance to 80% or by 1/5th of its performance
capability [20, 21]. Thus, the encryption/decryption overhead of SSL based services
poses a significant problem [22].
Dedicated hardware and software technologies have been introduced to accelerate
the SSL protocol [23, 24]. Modern L4/L7 switches provide hardware support for SSL
acceleration as part of the switch configuration. SSL VPN products from vendors such as
Array Networks [25], Aventail [26], Cisco [27], Juniper Networks [28], Nokia [29],
NetScaler [30], Netilla Networks [31], NetSilica [32], Nortel Networks [33], Symantec
(appliance) [34], Whale Communications [35], etc. come equipped with SSL VPN as one
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NetScaler [30], Netilla Networks [31], NetSilica [32], Nortel Networks [33], Symantec
(appliance) [34], Whale Communications [35], etc. come equipped with SSL VPN as one
of the standard features.
Software approaches to accelerate SSL-based connections have also emerged in
an attempt to provide fast and secure VPN connectivity. Software vendors such as Areabe
[36], CheckPoint [37], Citrix [38], Menlo Logic [39], OvisGate [40], PortWise [41],
Symantec [34], Tarantella [42], V-ONE [43], 3SP (open-source) [44], etc. support SSL
VPN features in their product offerings.

1.3 Problem Statement
While the hardware and software solutions described in the previous section increase the
performance of SSL computing, two issues remain unanswered, namely performance
scalability and closed-box vs. open-source. As these products and approaches are closedboxes and proprietary in nature, it is very difficult for the vast majority of the opensource community to make any changes for improvement and customize them for
specific needs. While scaling with these closed-boxes is cost-prohibitive and complex in
most cases, it is simply unrealistic in others.
The primary objective is to examine the feasibility of separating the SSL protocol
phases across process boundaries and measure any gains thereof, in an effort to improve
the clustering capabilities and increase the performance of SSL-based computing. The
outcomes of this investigation hold a direct relevance to the larger problem domain of
clustering and scalability in VPN and Web servers using an open-source approach.
SSL is a protocol that ensures the security of the data transmitted over the
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Internet, using encryption capabilities that are automatically available in every browser.
The SSL protocol consists of two phases, the Handshake phase and the Record phase.
Currently, these phases are implemented to execute as part of a single operating system
process in user-mode. The goal is to distribute these phases over separate processes
executing on multiple servers. A successful separation will not only provide enhanced
options for clustering, but also potentially improve performance and scalability. The
performance gains demonstrated by such a distributed approach will be especially useful
in the area of SSL-based VPN services and HTTPS (HTTP over SSL).

CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND

Chapter 1 provided an introduction to VPN and the various protocols and approaches
used to provide VPN connectivity to clients. It also provided an overview of the SSLbased VPN services and a description of the problem statement as it relates to SSL-based
services. This chapter will discuss in brief, the TCP/IP communication protocol and the
two phases of the SSL protocol in more detail.

2.1 Protocol Architecture
The International Standards Organization (ISO) proposed a highly modular, layered
architecture for the communication protocols over the Internet called the Open Systems
Interconnection (OSI) model, published as OSI RM-ISO 7498. Figure 2.1 shows the OSI
protocol architecture. Table 2.1 gives a brief description of the services provided by each
layer.
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Figure 2.1 OSI layer architecture.
Table 2.1 OSI Layers and Services
Layer No. Layer Name

Services provided by Layer

1

Physical

Encoding and Signaling, Physical Data Transmission,
Hardware Specifications, Topology and Design

2

Data Link

Logical Link Control, Media Access Control, Data
Framing, Addressing, Error Detection and Handling,
Defining Requirements of Physical Layer

3

Network

Logical Addressing, Routing, Datagram Encapsulation,
Fragmentation and Reassembly, Error Handling and
Diagnostics

4

Transport

Process-Level Addressing, Multiplexing/Demultiplexing, Connections, Segmentation and
Reassembly, Acknowledgments and Retransmissions

5

Session

Session Establishment, Management and Termination

6

Presentation

Data Translation, Compression and Encryption

7

Application

User Application Services

Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) is a suite of protocols
that enable networks and machines to be interconnected and forms the basic foundation
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for the Internet. The TCP/IP suite of protocols is a subset of the OSI model and contains
five layers in its architecture. The services provided by the various TCP/IP layers are the
same as the ones provided by the OSI model. The layers in the TCP/IP suite are shown in
Figure 2.2.

Application Layer
Transport Layer (TCP)
Network Layer (IP)
Data Link Layer
Physical Layer
Figure 2.2 TCP/IP layer architecture.
SSL runs beneath application layer protocols such as HTTP, SMTP and NNTP
and above the TCP transport layer protocol. Figure 2.3 shows the location of SSL within
the TCP/IP protocol suite. In practice, applications that wish to use SSL for
communication make use of standard software libraries that provide services constructed
around the TCP/IP stack, which is exposed through the system call interface on most
operating systems.
Application Layer (HTTP)
SSL
Transport Layer (TCP)
Network Layer (IP)
Data Link Layer
Physical Layer

Figure 2.3 Location of SSL in the TCP/IP protocol stack.
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2.2 SSL Connection Phases
SSL connections are divided into two phases, the Handshake and Record phases [43].
The SSL Handshake phase authenticates the server (optionally, the client) and establishes
the cryptographic keys which are used to protect the transmitted data. The Handshake
phase must be completed before any application data can be transmitted. Once it is
complete, the data to be communicated is broken up into fragments, which are encrypted
and then transmitted as a series of packets. This phase is called the SSL Record phase.

2.3 SSL Handshake
During the SSL Handshake, the server and optionally, the client, are authenticated using
digital certificates. An encryption algorithm is selected from a set of predefined
algorithms and a symmetric key is chosen for each direction of communication. The
following series of messages are exchanged by the server and the client to perform a
successful SSL Handshake [45]. Figure 2.4 illustrates the same.
1. The client sends the server, the client's SSL version number, cipher settings,
randomly generated data, and other information required by the server to
communicate with the client using SSL. This step is denoted by the client-hello
message in Figure 2.4.
2. The server sends the client, the server's SSL version number, cipher settings,
randomly generated data, and other information the client needs to communicate with
the server over SSL. The server also sends its own certificate and, if the client is
requesting a server resource that requires client authentication, requests the client's
certificate. This step is denoted by the server-hello message in the Figure 2.4.
3. The client uses some of the information sent by the server to authenticate the server.
If the server cannot be authenticated, the user is warned of the problem and informed
that an encrypted and authenticated connection cannot be established. If the server
can be successfully authenticated, the client moves on to step 4.
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4. Using all data generated in the handshake so far, the client (with the cooperation of
the server, depending on the cipher being used) creates the pre-master secret for the
session, encrypts it with the server's public key (obtained from the server's certificate,
sent in Step 2), and sends the encrypted pre-master secret to the server. This step is
denoted by the client-premaster-key message in Figure 2.4.
5. If the server has requested client authentication (an optional step in the handshake),
the client also signs another piece of data that is unique to this handshake and known
by both the client and server. In this case the client sends both the signed data and the
client's own certificate to the server along with the encrypted pre-master secret.

I

► client-hello •

• server-hello

•

► client-premaster•
key
-. client-verify .-

--■ client-finish .-

• server-verify

•

• server-finish

4

Figure 2.4 SSL Handshake.
6. If the server has requested client authentication, the server attempts to authenticate
the client. If the client cannot be authenticated, the session is terminated. If the client
can be successfully authenticated, the server uses its private key to decrypt the premaster secret and performs a series of steps (The steps are also performed by the
client, starting from the same pre-master secret) to generate the master secret.
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7. The client and the server, then, use the master secret to generate the session keys,
called the write-key and the read-key. These are symmetric keys used to encrypt and
decrypt information exchanged during the SSL Record phase and to verify the
integrity of the SSL session, i.e., to detect any changes in the data between the time it
was sent and the time it is received over the SSL connection. Different keys are used
for each direction of transmission. Feeding the master key, the session identifier, and
the challenge data through an algorithm generates the session keys. The two ends of
the SSL connection do this independently.
8. The client then sends a message denoted by client-verify to the server informing it
that future messages from the client will be encrypted with the session key. It then
sends a separate (encrypted) message indicating that the client portion of the
handshake is finished. This step is denoted by the client-finish message in Figure
2.4.
9. The server sends a message denoted by server-verify to the client informing it that
future messages from the server will be encrypted with the session key. It then sends
a separate (encrypted) message indicating that the server portion of the handshake is
finished. This step is denoted by the server-finish message in Figure 2.4.
10. The SSL Handshake phase is now complete, and the SSL session is completely
established. The client and the server use the session keys to encrypt and decrypt the
data they send to each other and to validate its integrity.

2.4 SSL Record Protocol
The purpose of the SSL Handshake phase is to setup the shared data required to enable
the sending and receiving of protected data. In SSL, the actual data transfer is
accomplished during the second phase using the SSL Record Protocol [46]. The SSL
Record Protocol works by breaking up the data stream to be transmitted into a series of
fragments, each of which is independently encrypted and transferred. On the receiving
end, each record is decrypted and verified.
To ensure the integrity of the message and to guard against an attacker replying to
an old message, a Message Authentication Code (MAC) is computed over the data to be
transmitted. The MAC is concatenated to the data and the entire block is then encrypted
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to form the payload. Finally, a header is attached to the payload to form a record. These
records are then transmitted using lower level protocols such as TCP. If necessary,
random padding data will be added to an application message to make it the correct
length for the encryption algorithm to process.

2.5 SSL Record Format
There are three record types for SSL Version 3: (1) Handshake (2) Alert - warning or
fatal error (3) Data - application data
The data in any SSL record has the following characteristics: (1) A variable
length and starts with a 5-byte record header; (2) Contains handshake data, alert data or
application data; (3) Is encrypted, except for the first few messages in the handshake
message flows. The format of an SSL Record is as follows:
Byte 0:

SSL Record Type

Bytes 1-2:

SSL Version (major/minor)

Bytes 3-4:

Length of data in the record (excluding the header itself). The

maximum record size supported by SSL 16384 bytes (16K).

CHAPTER 3
PROPOSED APPROACH

The previous chapter explained in detail the SSL protocol phases and the format of the
records transmitted between the end points of an SSL connection. This chapter will focus
on the computational overhead caused by the encryption and decryption activities carried
out by the server during the SSL Handshake and Record phases, and delve into the
strategies available to improve server throughput and performance. The proposed
approach consisting of distributing the SSL protocol phases over separate processes is
described and the advantages it provides are discussed.

3.1 Cryptography and Clustering
Once a client and a server have completed the Handshake phase, they can communicate
using standard encryption algorithms such as DES, RC4, etc. These algorithms, called
ciphers, use a technique called symmetric-key cryptography. Symmetric-key
cryptography uses a common key for both encrypting and decrypting data. Symmetric
key cryptography is relatively fast compared to public-key cryptography [47].
Public-key cryptography uses a pair of keys, called private key and public key and
is usually based on the RSA algorithm. Typically, 1024-bit RSA key-pairs are used in
SSL-based communications. Public-key cryptography is also called asymmetric-key
cryptography, since it uses a pair of keys, to perform the encryption and decryption of
information. During the Handshake phase, public-key cryptography is used to exchange
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important pieces of data (pre-master secret and challenge data) used to generate the
symmetric keys called session keys. In addition, the Handshake phase performs server
authentication (optionally, client authentication) and negotiation of ciphers.
The Handshake phase is computationally very intensive owing to the public-key
cryptography in addition to the load imposed by the authentication and symmetric key
generation activities [22]. This is a major cause of bottlenecks in servers supporting SSLbased communications. In many cases, such bottlenecks limit a server to as few as five or
ten SSL handshake transactions per second depending on the power of the server.
Delegating the computationally intensive cryptographic operations from the server to a
separate and specially designed device/entity can distribute the load on the CPU and
increase throughput. Thus, cryptographic operations required by SSL create a need for
load distribution through clustering.

3.2 SSL Accelerators
A specialized device that is designed to handle the extra computational burden imposed
by the SSL Handshake phase is called an SSL Accelerator [48, 49]. SSL Accelerators are
available in two forms, internal cards and network devices [50]. Internal cards generally
handle the SSL encryption and decryption process, leaving the server to cope with
activities such as session set-up, key exchange and cipher suite negotiations. External
network devices are capable of handling the entire SSL workload, so that the traffic
entering and leaving the server is in plain HTTP format or other clear-text. Although SSL
Accelerators provide numerous advantages, they pose the following disadvantages:
• Expensive and highly specialized.
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•

Complex setup and configuration requirements.

•

Difficult to perform customizations since all the functionality is built into the
hardware.

•

Application functionality — Most commercially available SSL Accelerators are
designed and built to operate in conjunction with web servers providing HTTPS
capabilities.

•

Symmetric encryption for large data sizes — SSL Accelerators usually provide
assistance with the public-key cryptography portion of a Handshake. Once the initial
SSL session is established, the Accelerator plays no part in further connections with
the same SSL session. Although some are capable of performing symmetric
encryption, the overheads of actually sending the information to the hardware to be
encrypted or decrypted is often higher (both in terms of latency and system resources)
than just performing the operations directly in the server. This problem of increasing
loads due to symmetric encryption becomes especially significant when the size of
data to be encrypted is large, in the order of hundreds of Kilobytes to Megabytes and
higher.

•

Large decryption loads on servers — The increased load due to symmetric decryption
is also significant when decryption is required at the server for large data volumes In
the case of web servers, which typically use SSL, the decryption loads on the server
are insignificant compared to the encryption loads for out-going data. SSL VPNs on
the other hand, would have to handle large-volumes of data, both incoming and
outgoing.

•

Logical separation of SSL gateways and application servers providing data for
encryption — Separation of secure gateways to an enterprise from the application
servers is not possible due to tight coupling between software providing SSL
capabilities and application functionality.

•

Special requirements such as measurement of SSL encryption performance are not
easy to achieve due to proprietary hardware and firmware.

3.3 Separating the Handshake and Record Phases
The proposed approach to achieve performance gains and scalability involves the
separation of the SSL Handshake and the Record phases across process boundaries as
described below. A client such as a Web browser wishing to communicate with a server
(Web server, VPN server, etc.,) using SSL, establishes an SSL connection (SSL
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Handshake) followed by exchange of encrypted information through requests and
responses (SSL Record phase). Typically, the server process connected to the client
handles both the SSL protocol phases. The proposed approach involves one server
process handling the SSL Handshake phase while another handles the SSL Record phase.
Henceforth, SSLClient will refer to the client and SSLHandler, the server process
that participates in the SSL Handshake with the client. Initially, SSLClient and
SSLHandler perform an SSL Handshake. This is followed by the SSLHandler transferring
all the cryptographic information required by the SSL Record phase to an external process
called, SSLWorker. Figure 3.1 illustrates this simple two-step process of performing an
SSL Handshake.

Figure 3.1 SSL Handshake phase with separation.
The 2-step process described creates a pathway for two-way data communication

17
between the SSLClient and the SSLWorker during the SSL Record phase. Through this
pathway, the SSLWorker can receive encrypted data from the SSLClient, decrypt it, and
perform a series of custom actions as requested by the SSLClient and send back an
encrypted response. Examples of such custom actions include, but are not limited to
updating a database, creating media files, etc. The SSLHandler simply acts as an
intermediary during the SSL Record phase, passing encrypted data coming from the
SSLClient to the SSLWorker and vice-versa.
Figure 3.2 depicts SSL Record phase communications between the SSLClient and
the SSLWorker. Following Step 2 in Figure 3.1, the SSLClient creates a simple HTTP
request in Step 3 and transmits it to the SSLHandler as shown in Figure 3.2. The
SSLHandler receives the request and forwards it to the SSLWorker in Step 4. The
SSLWorker decrypts the request using the cryptographic information received from the
SSLHandler (after the SSL Handshake) and creates an encrypted response which is
transmitted back to the SSLHandler in Step 5. The SSLHandler re-transmits the response
received from the SSLWorker to the SSLClient in Step 6.
Steps 3 through 6 describe the crux of the proposed approach to separate the SSL
protocol phases across process boundaries. The SSLHandler handles all the processing
during the Handshake phase, and delegates the Record phase operations to the
SSLWorker instance. The separation provides the ability to selectively scale either the
servers performing the SSL Handshake phase or the ones involved in the SSL Record
phase or both, as the requirements demand. This is possible because, the SSLHandler and
SSLWorker processes can be executed on separate physical machines. The separation also
allows the time-consuming symmetric encryption and decryption of large data (hundreds
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of Kilobytes to Megabytes) to be moved and scaled on separate computers, thus enabling
the faster SSL Handshakes carried out by dedicated servers.

Figure 3.2 SSL Record phase with separation.

3.4

Open-source SSL Software

Open-source SSL software libraries such as OpenSSL provide the ability to perform SSL
communications over TCP/IP in a very simple fashion. It is also tailored for open-source
platforms such as the Linux operating system that runs on in-expensive x-86 hardware.
Put together, they offer a free and highly cost-effective solution in comparison to
expensive and proprietary hardware devices such as SSL Accelerators. The caveat is that
within OpenSSL, the SSL Handshake and SSL Record phases are tightly coupled within a
single operating system process.
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SSL-based communications using OpenSSL as-is, would not be flexible enough
to accomplish the separation of the SSL Handshake and Record phases across the
SSLHandler and SSL Worker processes respectively. No commercial products are
available in the market either to achieve such a separation. Custom software developed in
conjunction with OpenSSL would offer such a solution. The SSLHandler and SSLWorker
processes mentioned in the previous section constitute such custom software developed
around the OpenSSL software library in addition to minor modifications to the library
itself These minor modifications are required to make the open-source library adaptable
for such use.

3.5 Advantages of Delegation in Software
A software solution, as described in the previous sections, providing the ability to
delegate the SSL Record phase of an SSL connection to an external process provides the
following advantages:
•

Cost savings owing to the use of a freely available open-source platform such as
Linux and the open-source SSL software OpenSSL compared to expensive hardware
solutions involving SSL accelerators and load balancers.

•

High availability can be easily achieved at low cost by providing fail-over capabilities
to servers performing SSL Handshake and/or SSL Record phases as required.
Providing fail-over with SSL Accelerators will increase the already high cost of such
hardware.

•

Scaling can also be accomplished easily and cost effectively as compared to hardware
SSL Accelerators.

•

Ability to be designed and developed for easy setup and configuration with varying
degrees of customizability.

•

Ease of integration - Backend applications such as databases, file servers, multimedia servers, tunneling software, etc., can be easily integrated with processes that
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perform SSL Record phase communications.
•

Special measurements such as SSL Handshake and Record phase SSL encryption
performance can be easily collected by modifying any part of the open-source code
(Linux and/or SSL library source) to track any desired metrics.

•

Symmetric encryption for large data sizes — The ability to off-load the symmetric
encryption to an external process will prove beneficial for large data sizes. Typically,
multi-media servers, file servers, etc., which server large amounts of data to clients
require such capabilities.

•

Large decryption loads on servers — A software solution provides the ability to
decrypt large amounts of data on the server in an efficient manner since this activity
can be carried out by an external process. Large decryption loads are often
experienced by VPN and Secure Shell servers that provide tunneling capabilities to
clients.

CHAPTER 4
LOGICAL ORGANIZATION AND COMPONENTS

This chapter discusses the implementation details of the SSLHandler and SSL Worker
components introduced in the previous chapter. Also discussed are two software
processes called Handler Agent and Delegate Agent, used to manage the SSLHandler and
SSL Worker instances, respectively. The implementation includes the use of various opensource libraries and minor modifications to the OpenSSL library. The various data
structures used are also described in this chapter.

4.1 Software Platform and Libraries
Red Hat Linux 9 is the software platform used to implement the SSLClient, Handler
Agent, SSLHandler, Delegate Agent and SSL Worker executables. Code development was
carried out using the C programming language and gcc compiler.
OpenSSL version 0.9.7d is used to provide the required SSL functionality [51].
The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade,
full-featured, and open-source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL
v2/v3) and the Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength
general purpose cryptography library. The project is managed by a worldwide community
of volunteers that use the Internet to communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL
toolkit and its related documentation. OpenSSL is based on the SSLeay library developed
by Eric A. Young and Tim J. Hudson.
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ASN.1 stands for Abstract Syntax Notation One. ASN.1 allows the description of
complex data structures independently of any particular programming language. The
ASN.1 compiler can then take these ASN.1 specifications and produce a set of target
language (C, C++, Java) files which contain the native type definitions for these
abstractly specified structures, and also generate source code (function calls) which can
perform the conversions of these structures into/from a series of bytes (serialization/deserialization) [52]. These function calls provide the capability to transfer data structures
with information over the network or to write to external media.
An open-source ancillary library termed libancillary; version 0.9.1 is also used in
the implementation to provide an easy interface to UNIX domain sockets [53]. This
interface is used to pass file descriptors from one process to another and is used to
implement the session resumption capabilities as detailed in a separate section of this
chapter.

4.2

Overall Logical Architecture

Figure 4.1 shows the architecture comprising of the various processes and steps involved
in the separation of the SSL protocol phases. The Handler Agent and the Delegate Agent
represent daemons listening for incoming connections. The following steps illustrate the
process of establishing a new SSL connection before an SSLClient instance can send
encrypted requests and receive encrypted responses from the server.
1. An SSLClient instance initiates a new SSL Connection request with the Handler
Agent.
2. The Handler Agent spawns a child process, called the SSLHandler, to perform the
SSL Handshake.
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3. The SSLHandler instance connects to the Delegate Agent daemon for delegation.
4. In response to the connection request from the SSLHandler, the Delegate Agent
spawns a child process, called SSLWorker, to whom all the SSL requests will be
delegated to.
5. Then, the SSLClient and SSLHandler instances perform a full SSL Handshake.
6. The SSLHandler process collects all the cryptographic state information resulting
from the SSL Handshake and transports it to the SSL Worker instance.

Figure 4.1 Overall logical architecture.
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After Step 6, the SSLHandler is ready to delegate incoming requests from the
SSLClient to the SSLWorker instance. The SSLWorker instance is ready to receive
encrypted requests, decrypt it, and create encrypted responses. These responses are sent
back to the SSLHandler which, in turn forwards them to the SSLClient. The red and green
arrows shown in Figure 4.1 indicate the flow of requests and responses, respectively.
The process of SSL session resumption does not involve Steps 2 and 4 since there
is no need to spawn new SSLHandler and SSLWorker processes. The Handler Agent and
the Delegate Agent re-use the previously spawned processes by locating them based on
the resuming SSL session identifier in the connection request (Step 1). More details on
this are provided in a later chapter.

4.3 Transferring the SSL Cryptographic State
While an SSLHandler instance performs the handshake with the SSLClient, the process of
data encryption and decryption in the SSL Record phase is performed by a SSLWorker
instance running on a separate server. So, there is a need to transfer the cryptographic
state (keys, ciphers, etc.,) attained by the SSLHandler instance after the completion of the
handshake to its corresponding SSLWorker instance.
The transfer of cryptographic state is achieved by the use of ASN.1. The
OpenSSL structure SSL* stores all the cryptographic information required to delegate the
SSL Record phase to an external process. This structure in turn, contains OpenSSL
structures such as SSLSession* and SSLCipher* along with other information. An ASN.1
specification was developed to represent the minimal information contained in the SSL*
and its nested structures, required during the SSL Record phase. This specification was
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provided as input to the asnlc compiler, which produced the C language files with
headers.
The asnlc is a free, open source compiler of ASN.1 specifications into C source
code [54]. It supports a range of ASN.1 syntaxes, including ISO/IEC/ITU ASN.1 1988,
'94, '97, '02 and later amendments. The encoding used in this implementation is as per the
Basic Encoding Rules (BER) syntax.

4.4 Handler Agent and SSLHandler
The Handler Agent spawns a child process, referred to as SSLHandler, to serve each new
SSL connection request (requests without an SSL session identifier). SSL connection
requests with an SSL session identifier are handed over to the previously spawned
SSLHandler process that served a request with the same session identifier. The flowcharts
shown below show the actions taken by the Handler Agent and SSLHandler processes in
serving incoming requests.
Figure 4.2 represents the actions taken by Handler Agent in particular. The
initialization step involves two main activities: (1) Reading a configuration file called
entryserver. config (2) Setup of a hash table called the SessionlD table to keep track of the
SSL session identifiers and the SSLHandler instances serving these SSL sessions. The
entryserver. config file contains the server names and the respective port numbers of the
Delegate Agent instances to connect to in a round-robin fashion. Future sections in this
chapter discuss the implementation of SessionID table and the enablement of SSL session
resumption in more detail.
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Figure 4.2 Handler Agent.
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As the Handler Agent listens for incoming requests and accepts a connection, it
checks the request to see if an SSL session identifier is present. If it does not find one, the
request is treated as one coming from a new SSLClient. First, a pair of sockets is created
using the socketpair() system call. The Handler Agent will use one socket from this pair
to communicate with its child. This is followed by the spawning of a new child process
(SSLHandler) using the fork() system call. The SSLHandler instance can communicate
with the Handler Agent since it inherits both the socket descriptors from its parent
(Handler Agent). The Handler Agent then sends the socket descriptor obtained by
accepting an incoming connection request from an SSLClient to the SSLHandler. This
enables the SSLHandler to communicate directly with the SSLClient to perform an SSL
Handshake. Meanwhile, the Handler Agent returns to accept any more waiting
connection requests.
On the other hand, if a newly accepted connection request contains an SSL
session identifier, the Handler Agent tries to retrieve the value stored in the SessionlD
hash table stored against a key identical to the SSL session identifier. The value stored
against the session identifier key is the socket descriptor (derived from the socketpair()
call) capable of communicating with the SSLHandler instance that had previously served
a request with the same session identifier. Upon retrieving this socket, the Handler Agent
uses it to send the new socket descriptor obtained by accepting the incoming connection
request from SSLClient to the appropriate SSLHandler instance. This enables an
SSLHandler instance to resume an SSL session without the need to perform a full
Handshake again.
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Figure 4.3 SSLHandler.
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Figure 4.3 depicts the flow of actions taken by an SSLHandler instance. It sets up
the OpenSSL SSL_CTX* structure and connects to an instance of SSLWorker. All SSL
Record phase communications from the SSLClient will be delegated to this SSLWorker
instance. This is followed by the receipt of the socket descriptor holding a connection to
the SSLClient. The OpenSSL library call SSL_accept() performs a Handshake or a
session resumption depending on the presence of an SSL session identifier in the data
sent by SSLClient. This is followed by the relaying of the session identifier back to
Handler Agent for inserts/updates to its SessionlD table. The SSLHandler process then
uses the ASN.1 routines (generated by the asnlc compiler) to communicate all the
pertinent cryptographic state information to the SSL Worker, which enables it to delegate
the SSL Record phase.

4.5 Delegate Agent and SSLWorker
The Delegate Agent spawns a child process, referred to as SSLWorker, to serve the SSL
Record phase needs of an SSLHandler process, which, in turn communicates with an
instance of SSLClient. The Delegate Agent waits for new connection requests and spawns
a child process (SSL Worker) after accepting a new connection. This is illustrated in
Figure 4.4.
An SSLWorker sets up the OpenSSL SSL_CTX* structure and waits for incoming
data (cryptographic information) from its corresponding SSLHandler. It creates the
required SSL* and its nested data structures and copies the cryptographic information
received into these structures. This enables the SSLWorker instance to encrypt/decrypt
information. This process is illustrated in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.4 Delegate Agent.

Figure 4.5 SSLWorker.
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4.6 SSLClient
The SSLClient functions as depicted in Figure 4.6. It initializes and sets up the
SSL CTX* structure. It follows this by creating a TCP/IP based socket connection to the

Handler Agent. Using this socket, an SSL connection is established (through an
SSL _connect() call) with an SSLHandler process.

Figure 4.6 SSLClient.
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HTTP requests are sent through this SSL connection in an encrypted format and
responses are read back and decrypted. After the first request-response cycle, an attempt
is made to resume the previously created SSL session by retrieving the SSLSession*
from the SSL* structure and re-using it in a new SSL connection. After a pre-determined
number of such session resumptions, the SSLClient terminates. This sequence of actions
simulates a real-world user establishing a new SSL connection with a backend
application server, carrying out some transactions and then disconnecting.

4.7

Resuming the SSLSession

The ability to resume an SSL session is very important since SSL resumption is a highly
efficient operation that eliminates the need for returning SSL clients to perform a
complete SSL Handshake [3]. SSL session resumption is implemented by means of a
hash table used to keep track of SSLHandler processes that have previously performed an
SSL Handshake and served a request. This hash table is called the SessioniD table
throughout this document. The following C structures show the data stored in each entry
of the hash table.
struct key {
char session id[32];
};
struct value {
int sd;
} ;
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The SSLHandler process communicates a newly established SSL session
identifier to the Handler Agent through a UNIX domain socket. The Handler Agent
receives this information and creates a new entry in the SessionlD table with the SSL
session identifier as the key (struct key) and the corresponding socket descriptor as the
value (struct value). This socket descriptor represents the SSLHandler process in the
Handler Agent since it provides the ability to communicate with the SSLHandler
instance, at will. Although session resumptions do not usually result in a change to the
SSL session identifier it has been observed that some session identifiers undergo a
change upon session resumption. This creates the need for an SSLHandler instance to
communicate the session identifier back to Handler Agent for every request received.
This two-way communication channel enables Handler Agent to send socket descriptors
(representing connections to SSLClient instances) to the appropriate SSLHandler
instances during session resumptions.
New SSLHandler instances are created only when a SSL session is to be
established for the first time with an SSLClient. These instances are not destroyed after
the completion of the first request, but are preserved in memory. By preserving these
running SSLHandler processes, it is possible to resume SSL sessions with minimal
overhead by avoiding the creation of new processes with each subsequent request from
the same SSLClient. The Handler Agent peeks into a connection request to see if a SSL
session identifier is available. If one is present, it looks up the SessionlD table to retrieve
the UNIX domain socket connecting it to the appropriate SSLHandler instance. The
socket descriptor representing the new client connection is then transported to the
SSLHandler via the UNIX domain socket for session resumption to take place.

CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND IMPLEMENTATION

This chapter discusses in detail the experimental setup used to run the SSLClient, Handler
Agent, SSLHandler, Delegate Agent and SSLWorker processes described in the previous
chapter including sections to describe the hardware used, server configurations, metrics
collected and the method used to collect them

5.1 Hardware
The hardware used in the experiments along with their specifications is listed below.
•

3 servers with the following specifications: 2.1 GHz, 512 MB RAM, 2 GB swap
space. These servers were primarily used as load generators by spawning SSLClient
instances as background processes through shell script.

•

1 server with the following specifications: 2.1 GHz, 512 MB RAM, 2 GB swap space.
This server was used to run the Handler Agent and all the SSLHandler instances.

•

1 server with the following specifications: 2.1 GHz, 512 MB RAM, 2 GB swap space.
This server hosted the Delegate Agent and SSL Worker processes in the 2-Server
configuration. It was also used to run the datacollector tool for collection of metrics
reported by the SSLHandler processes. The datacollector tool is described briefly in a
separate section of this chapter.

5.2 Server Configurations
Two different server configurations were used to compare the performance of the
proposed approach (using separation of SSL protocol phases) against the current
approach (without separation). These configurations are referred to as No-delegation and
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2-Server configurations. The test results obtained from the No-delegation configuration
will be used as a benchmark for comparing the performance gains and losses against the
2-Server configuration.

Figure 5.1 No-delegation configuration.
Figure 5.1 shows the No-delegation configuration. In this configuration, the

Handler Agent and all the SSLHandler instances run on the same server. The SSLHandler
instances perform all the SSL Record phase operations without delegating to SSL Worker
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instances. This configuration mirrors the classical setup used in most applications using
SSL. The dark (solid black) lines indicate two-way data flows between pairs of SSLClient

— SSLHandler processes. A one-to-one correspondence exists between these processes.

Figure 5.2 2-Server configuration.
Figure 5.2 shows the 2-Server configuration. In this configuration, the Handler

Agent and its children (SSLHandler processes), run on one server while the Delegate
Agent and its children (SSL Worker processes) run on a separate server. The physical
server running the Handler Agent and its children will be referred to as the Front-End
server, and the server running the Delegate Agent and its children, as the Back-End
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server. A one-to-one relationship exists between SSLClient, SSLHandler and SSLWorker
processes. In this configuration, all SSL Record phase processing is off-loaded to the
Back-End server.
The Load Generator shown in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 comprised of three
machines with similar capacities. Such a scheme was adopted to ensure that the
concurrency generated by the load was as close to the realistic Internet loads as possible.

5.3 Metrics
Experimental runs were carried out under varying loads generated by the load generating
machines. Each run created a load on the server by executing the SSLClient instances
concurrently. Varying loads were created by executing 100 to 900 SSLClient instances in
steps of 100 each for each run. Each of these runs was repeated for different data sizes of
2 KB, 6 KB, 10 KB, 20 KB and 200 KB. The following metrics were collected by
SSLHandler and SSL Worker instances during each run for analysis.
•

Handshake time: This value is the time taken (in milliseconds) to perform a
complete SSL Handshake by the SSLHandler with the SSLClient. The relevance of
this metric holds for both the No-delegation and 2-Server configurations detailed in
the previous sections since the SSL Handshake is always performed between an
SSLClient and an SSLHandler processes.

•

Encryption time: This is the time taken (in milliseconds) by an SSL Worker instance
to perform symmetric encryptions in response to requests. This value does not include
the time taken to send the encrypted responses over the network.

•

Session Initiation time: Session Initiation represents the first SSL connection
negotiated by an SSLClient instance with an SSLHandler instance and it includes the
receipt of a request and the generation of corresponding response. It is relevant for
both the No-delegation and 2-Server configurations. The total time taken (in
milliseconds) by an SSLHandler instance to perform Session Initiation with an
SSLClient instance is called Session Initiation time.

•

Session Resumption time: This represents the resumption of an SSL session after its
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establishment through the Session Initiation process. The total time taken (in
milliseconds) by an SSLHandler instance to resume an SSL session is called Session
Resumption time. Like Session Initiation, this term holds relevance for both the Nodelegation and 2-Server configurations too.

• Total processing time: In every run, an SSLClient instance generated three requests
in succession, the first one being a Session Initiation and the other two, Session
Resumptions. Each SSLHandler instance tracked the Session Initiation and the two
Session Resumption times. The total processing time (in milliseconds) is the
difference in the time between the beginning of the Session Initiation and the end of
the last Session Resumption.
The above listed metrics were collected by each SSLHandler instance and
reported to a tool called the datacollector. The datacollector is a simple executable that
listens for connections on TCP/IP based sockets and collects the incoming data. This data
is then appended to a file for later analysis. One such data file was created by each
experimental run.

CHAPTER 6
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

This chapter lists and discusses the results obtained by carrying out the experiments
detailed in the pervious chapter. The analysis performed on these results will not only
provide an insight into the benefits gained by the separation of the protocol phases, but
also help peer into the future scope and potential gains thereof.

6.1 Handshake Times
Handshake times were measured in the 2-Server configuration (Figure 5.2) on an idle
machine and averaged to obtain a value of 64 milliseconds. Although the SSL
Handshake involves the exchange of multiple messages between the client and the server
and the latencies depend on the various Internet factors such as routing, congestion,
packet loss, etc., the test environment was highly controlled due to the clients and servers
residing on the same network. This eliminated the typical latencies introduced by the
Internet. Thus, the SSL Handshake time measured is a reasonably good measure of the
server's ability to perform the cryptographic operations required. At this rate, the server
hosting the SSLHandler processes was able to perform a theoretical maximum of 15.62
SSL Handshakes/sec.
Table 6.1 shows the average Handshake times in milliseconds for the Nodelegation and 2-Server configurations at various data sizes. The average Handshake
times remain fairly constant at various data sizes, although a slight increase can be seen
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for data sizes of 200 KB in both the server configurations. This increase could possibly
be due to the increased network latency caused by the large data transfers between the
SSLWorker - SSLHandler and SSLHandler - SSLClient pairs. Refer to Table A.1 in
Appendix A for a detailed listing of Handshake times recorded under various load
conditions. It is also worth noting from that the variance of the Handshake times from the
mean is very small in Table A.1.
From Table 6.1, it is evident that there is a drop in Handshake times at higher data
rates (200 KB) for the 2-Server configuration compared to the No-delegation
configuration. This can be attributed to the fact that the Front-End server is less loaded
and free to handle Handshakes faster due to the off-loading of the SSL Record phase
encryptions to the Back-End server. Refer to Table A.1 for a detailed listing of
Handshake times and percentage differences. The negative percentage differences are due
to lower average Handshake times in the 2-Server configuration as compared to the Nodelegation configuration.
Table 6.1 Average SSL Handshake Times

Data Size
2 KB
6 KB
10 KB
20 KB
200 KB

Handshake time in milliseconds
2-Server
No-delegation
65
65
66
65
66
66
66
66
82
74
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6.2

Encryption Times

Encryption times were measured in the 2-Server configuration at various loading
conditions and data sizes. Table 6.2 lists the average Encryption time measured at
conditions of No-load and loads of 300, 600 and 900 SSLHandler instances each, for
varying data sizes. The column titled No-load in Table 6.2 indicates measurements taken
by running one instance of the SSLWorker on an idle machine. These values represent the
best performance attainable on the given server. Figure 6.1 displays the same in a
graphical format.

Table 6.2 Average Encryption Times

Data size

No-load

2 KB
6 KB
10 KB
20 KB
200 KB

<1
0.33
0.67
1.33
19.83

Encryption time in milliseconds
900
600
300
SSLHandlers SSLHandlers SSLHandlers
0.08
0.58
1.21
3.84
68.09

0.09
0.51
1.35
4.62
92.54

0.11
0.51
1.45
3.85
108.67

From Figure 6.1, it is evident that the Encryption times increase in direct
proportion to the data size at No-load conditions. As the load increases, the encryption
times increase rapidly with increasing data sizes for each load condition. The increase is
more pronounced at higher data sizes (200 KB) and higher loads (900 SSLHandler
instances). By extrapolation of this trend for data sizes higher than 200 KB, it is clear that
a server is significantly burdened at high loads and large data sizes.
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Figure 6.1 Comparison of encryption times.

6.3 Total Processing Times
Total processing times were collected for experimental runs differing in terms of the load
and size of the data requested. A Total processing time value represents the time taken to
receive the three requests, carry out the required SSL handshake/session resumption
activities and perform the data encryption. Since latencies introduced by the Internet are
eliminated in the experimental setup, this value is a good measure of the throughput by
the server. The values for the No-delegation and 2-Server configurations (Figure 5.1 and
Figure 5.2) for each data size and load are listed.
Table 6.4 lists the % difference between the No-delegation and 2-Server
configurations for the various data sizes and loads. The positive values in green cells
indicate improved throughput in the 2-Server configuration over the No-delegation
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configuration, while the negative values indicate degradation in throughput experienced
in the 2-Server configuration. The red cells indicate especially large amounts of
degradation (10% or more).
From Table 6.4, a relatively large number of green cells are seen in columns for
smaller data sizes (2 KB, 6 KB and 10 KB) than at larger data sizes (20 KB and 200 KB).
This indicates that at small data sizes, the 2-Server configuration provides improved
throughput over a wide range of load conditions, in spite of the additional overhead
caused by TCP/IP communication between with the SSLHandler and SSL Worker
instances. As the data size increases, the performance deteriorates as is evident by the
clustering of red cells in the 20 KB and 200 KB categories. This can be attributed to the
overhead caused by the introduction of additional network communication between the
SSLHandler and SSLWorker instances running on physically separate servers.

Table 6.3 Total Processing Times*
200K

20K

10K

6K

2K
SSLHandlers

Nodelegation

2-Server

Nodelegation

2Server

Nodelegation

2-Server

Nodelegation

2-Server

Nodelegation

2Server

100

12992

12146

12277

12213

12085

12240

12686

14371

16473

18534

200

30148

28461

30751

32266

30554

27764

28165

28689

31653

49986

300

52658

35164

35457

35781

35313

37077

35403

38736

69073

72399

400

98917

57550

101687

100541

54760

57173

58594

100296

103286

97812

500

106246

100252

103248

105474

99687

99015

114885

104829

111141

126694

600

111905

121365

200113

195896

110869

197278

197072

198844

199972

233922

700

201871

199791

224090

205139

207789

203041

209263

203768

219664

221333

800

224866

236615

232573

205737

223980

221710

223008

216553

224173

231996

900

223362

225980

225341

234247

240802

245075

225134

246726

293698

288752

*A11 values in Table 6.3 are in milliseconds.

Table 6.4 % Difference in Total Processing Times
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Figure 6.2 Comparison of total processing times.
Notice that the degradation in the 2-Server configuration's performance is <5% in
15 out of 25 cells in Table 6.4 (see red cells with negative percentages). This, in spite of
increased communication overhead (almost doubled), indicates that the 2-Server
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configuration provides potential for significant improvements in server throughput via a
mechanism, where-in, a SSLWorker instance completely by-passes its corresponding
SSLHandler instance while responding to a request. This fact is evident in Figure 6.2
where the lines closely follow each other or separate in favor of the 2-Server
configurations except in a few cases at large data sizes.

6.4 Session Initiation and Resumption Times
Session Initiation is the process of serving the first request from an SSLClient by the
SSLHandler, where a full SSL Handshake is performed. Session Resumption is the
process of resuming an already existing SSL session, which is usually the preferred
method for purposes of efficiency. In this case, a complete SSL Handshake is not
performed.
Table 6.5 % Increase in Session Initiation and Resumption Times
Session Initiation
Data Size
% Increase
2 KB
8.409
6 KB
8.391
10 KB
8.375
20 KB
8.324
200 KB
51.278

Session Resumption
% Increase
Data Size
7.556
2 KB
6 KB
7.565
8.056
10 KB
14.141
20 KB
215.436
200 KB

The average values of Session Initiation and Session Resumption times for each
load condition was computed for a given data size. A listing of these average Session
Initiation and Session Resumption times are as shown in Appendix B and Appendix C
respectively. A mean of these averages over different load conditions was computed for
each data size. The resulting percentage increases of these averages for the 2-Server
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configuration over the No-delegation configuration are listed in Table 6.5. Figure 6.2
displays the log (base 2) of these percentage increases plotted against the data size.

Figure 6.3 Log % increase versus data size.
The pattern of increase in average Session Initiation times (Figure 6.3) closely
mirrors the average Handshake times (Table 6.1). The % increase stays mostly constant
for data sizes 2 KB, 6 KB, 10 KB and 20 KB, and increases sharply for 200 KB. This
implies the addition of an overhead that is a proportionally constant to the No-delegation
Session Initiation times at every data size. A similar observation can be made regarding
the Session Resumption times and the average Handshake times too. The % increase
remains roughly constant for data sizes 2 KB, 6 KB and 10 KB, with a small increase for
20 KB followed by a sharp increase for 200 KB. Network communication overhead
caused by the SSLHandler acting as an intermediary between the SSLWorker and the
SSLClient during the Record phase provides a plausible explanation to such observations.
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This network communication overhead is not introduced in the No-delegation
configuration since the SSLHandler instances perform all of the SSL Record phase
encryption and return the data directly to the client.

6.5 Experimental Limitations
During the experimental runs, it was observed that the Front-End server reached the limit
of its processing capabilities when the number of SSLHandler processes reached slightly
beyond 1000. The 1-minute loadavg valued reached highs of 50-60. Such values for the
loadavg indicate that the server is stretched well beyond its capabilities. In such cases, it
was also noticed that many SSLHandler instances failed to complete their processing.
Ideally, a cluster of Front-End servers is desirable to distribute the load under such
conditions. A limitation in available hardware prevented such clustering and conducting
experimental runs exceeding 900 SSLHandler instances.
The number of machines used to generate the load imposes a limitation on the
experiments too. In the experiments conducted, three machines were used to generate
loads with a peak load of 300 SSLClient instances from each machine contributing to 900
SSLClient instances in total. This number is not nearly close enough to realistic Internet
loads in the tens to thousands to millions of clients.

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS

The separation of the SSL protocol phases across process boundaries, which can be
distributed over multiple machines was investigated and the results, discussed in the
previous chapter. A set of conclusions can be drawn from these results that direct our
attention to the potential benefits of using such a distributed approach and entail the
future scope of work that can be carried out in this regard.
Although the SSL Handshake consumes computational resources at a much higher
order of magnitude as compared to the SSL Record phase at low data sizes and loads, the
SSL Record phase consumption grows to comparable orders and beyond, under high
loads and for large data sizes. Given the fact that the Handshake times measured in these
experiments are a good measure of the actual cryptographic loads involved due to the
isolation of the testing environment from the Internet, it is evident that clustering
capabilities and scalability provided by the separation of the SSL protocol phases will
provide benefits as the SSL Record phase begins to consume a larger proportion of
resources in comparison to the SSL Handshake during encryption and decryption of large
amounts of data. An indication of improvement in Handshake times at higher data rates
(200 KB) due to the offloading of SSL Record phase computations points toward a payoff
that can be gained at high data rates and at high loads.
At smaller data sizes (2 KB, 6 KB and 10 KB), the approach using SSL protocol
separation begins to show some improvement in server throughput in terms of the total
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number of requests processed per unit time. However, at larger data sizes of 20 KB, 200
KB and possibly higher, the benefits of separation begin to erode owing to the higher
communication overheads in the current implementation. This overhead is caused by the
data packets containing the encrypted response traversing the network protocol stack of
the SSLHandler up to the application layer (TCP) before being re-transmitted to the
client. This can be avoided by direct routing of responses to the client instead of a
passing through an intermediary. Direct routing can be achieved using NAT or such other
means.
There is a slight degradation in the Session Initiation and Session Resumption
times with SSL protocol separation. Again, this is caused by the additional overhead
introduced by the communication between the SSLHandler and the SSLWorker instances.
While the percentage increase in average initiation and resumption times is mostly
constant for smaller data sizes (up to 10 KB), it increases rapidly as the data size grows
larger (20 KB and higher). This increase directly contributes to the latency in response
times experienced by the clients requesting large amounts of data such as for large
images, video files, etc. Direct routing of responses from the SSLWorker to the SSL
clients would address the reduction of this overhead.
The load tests carried out in the experiments detailed in previous chapters are not
an exact representation of true load experienced by a server in the Internet, but only an
approximation. Concurrent requests were created by background clients running on
multiple machines residing within the same network as the servers. While such an
approach eliminated the latencies introduced by the Internet, large scale loads involving
tens of thousands to millions of clients is hard to create with limited hardware resources.

52
In view of such limitations, the results obtained from tests conducted provide only a
reasonable peek into the trends that can be expected under more realistic loads. These
trends can then be used to design more elaborate and accurate experiments to improve
server throughput.
It was observed that the Front-End server eventually posed a bottleneck. Scaling
and load-balancing multiple Front-End servers would solve the problem. The ideal
solution would contain m Front-End servers performing SSL Handshakes and delegating
the SSL Record phase to n Back-End servers. The m Front-End servers also require
seamless migration of SSL session information so that Session Initiation and Session
Resumptions can be carried out by different Front-End servers. Direct routing of
responses from Back-End servers to SSL clients would eliminate the communication
overhead experienced in our experiments.
Separation of the protocol phases is not intended for improving server throughput
alone, but also to enable the clustering of SSL based applications such as Web servers,
VPN servers, etc. for high availability. Hardware SSL Accelerators increase the cost of
providing high availability due to increased costs incurred in procuring and maintaining
backups for fail-over. Clustering by phase separation provides an economic alternative to
gain high availability since SSL sessions can be seamlessly migrated between processes
from one machine to another in case of failure. Scaling is also achieved at low cost by
adding additional computing power as required. Such open-source software based
solutions are also conducive to customizations as opposed to expensive and proprietary
hardware.
The key contribution of this thesis is the separation of the SSL Handshake and
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Record phases across processes executing on different machines. It was aimed at
clustering the SSL services offered by VPN and Web servers by offloading the
encryption and decryption services. It was demonstrated through load tests that improved
throughput can be achieved by such a separation, although at higher data rates, the
communication overhead erased the gains. Future scope of work was identified in the
form of eliminating the communication overhead through direct routing to improve
performance. Direct routing can be achieved by means of NAT or socket migration. This
concept is illustrated in Figure 7.1.

Figure 7.1 Direct routing of SSL responses.

CHAPTER 8
FUTURE SCOPE

Future work can be conducted in this area to address the shortcomings of the separation
and further enhance the scalability of servers providing SSL-based services. The key
shortfall in the approach developed arises from the routing of encrypted request from
SSLClient through the SSLHandler process en-route to the SSLWorker process and the
same of the encrypted response from the SSLWorker to the SSLClient. The latencies
introduced are mainly due to the fact that the data does not traverse just up to Layer 3 of
the protocol stack in the intermediary, but all the way up to the application layer and back
out again onto the network. Direct routing of data between the SSLClient and SSLWorker
achieved through NAT can eliminate this overhead during the SSL Record phase. The
proposed direct routing is illustrated in Figure 8.1.
Currently, the SSLHandler instances are responsible for both the SSL Handshake
and session resumption activities. Since SSL session resumption is relatively easy and
non-intensive, this activity can be carried out by the SSLWorker directly instead of the
SSLHandler. This will require the Handler Agent to hand-off SSL session resumption
requests to the appropriate SSLWorker instance as shown in Step 7 and 8 of Figure 8.1.
Such a hand-off will provide two benefits:
•

Eliminate the overhead of transmitting the SSL cryptographic information from the
SSLHandler to the SSLWorker

•

Remove the need for preserving SSLHandler instances on the Front-End server,
thereby reducing the number of running processes.
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Figure 8.1 Proposed enhancements.
Clustering of multiple Back-End servers providing SSL Record phase services has
already been made possible with the current implementation. A further extension of
clustering multiple Front-End servers will provide comprehensive scalability to the
solution. While an Initial Connection Request (Step 1 in Figure 8.1) can be satisfied by
any Front-End server, a Subsequent Connection Request (Step 8 in Figure 8.1)
containing an SSL session identifier can arrive at a Front-End server other than the one
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that processed the Initial Connection Request. At this time, the Handler Agent will
require the Back-End server and SSL Worker port number information to perform the
hand-off. Thus, to achieve Front-End clustering, the Handler Agent instances running on
separate Front-End servers will require the ability to share information mapping SSL
session identifiers to SSL Worker instances running on different Back-End servers. Such
sharing can be achieved by means of a shared cache or a simple communication protocol
between the Handler Agents.

APPENDIX A

HANDSHAKE TIMES

Handshake times for experimental runs under different loads and data sizes are
listed in Table A.1.
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Table A.1 Handshake Times*
200K
20K
10K
6K
2K
NoNoNoNo2-Server
NO
2-Server
2-Server
2-Server
2-Server
Clients
delegation
delegation
delegation
delegation
delegation
0.076
0.073
0.065
0.068
0.065
0.065
0.066
0.065
0.065
0.065
100
0.073
0.087
0.065
0.065
0.065
0.065
0.065
0.065
0.066
0.065
200
0.075
0.066
0.087
0.066
0.066
0.066
0.065
0.065
0.066
0.065
300
0.075
0.066
0.083
0.066
0.065
0.065
0.066
0.065
0.065
0.065
400
0.076
0.078
0.066
0.066
0.066
0.066
0.066
0.066
0.066
0.065
500
0.074
0.081
0.066
0.066
0.066
0.066
0.065
0.065
0.065
0.065
600
0.074
0.082
0.066
0.066
0.065
0.065
0.066
0.065
0.066
0.065
700
0.082
0.075
0.066
0.066
0.066
0.065
0.065
0.065
0.066
0.065
800
0.074
0.066
0.081
0.066
0.066
0.066
0.065
0.065
0.066
0.065
900
0.074
0.082
0.066
0.066
0.066
0.065
0.066
0.066
0.065
0.065
Average
%

Difference

0.01%

*All values in Table 6.3 are in seconds.

-0.02%

0.01%

-0.03%

-0.80%

APPENDIX B

SESSION INITIATION TIMES

Session Initiation times for experimental runs under different loads and data sizes are
listed in Table B.1.
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Table B.1 Session Initiation Times*
200K
20K
10K
2K
6K
NoNoNoNoNo2-Server
2-Server
2-Server
2-Server
2-Server
Clients
delegation
delegation
delegation
delegation
delegation
1.277
1.134
1.159
1.074
1.161
1.094
1.074
1.159
1.074
1.157
100
1.670
1.168
1.227
1.163
1.083
1.157
1.075
1.075
1.162
1.075
200
2.114
1.217
1.168
1.156
1.080
1.159
1.076
1.077
1.159
1.074
300
1.634
1.194
1.084
1.171
1.158
1.077
1.074
1.074
1.162
1.159
400
1.693
1.151
1.083
1.168
1.079
1.163
1.161
1.075
1.074
1.159
500
1.210
1.736
1.168
1.162
1.082
1.158
1.077
1.075
1.074
1.159
600
1.692
1.193
1.169
1.083
1.159
1.075
1.076
1.161
1.075
1.158
700
1.705
1.170
1.200
1.084
1.162
1.159
1.077
1.075
1.157
1.075
800
1.206
1.826
1.166
1.085
1.160
1.157
1.078
1.076
1.075
1.158
900
1.193
1.705
1.160
1.084
1.168
1.159
1.077
1.075
1.075
1.159
Average
51.28%
8.32%
8.38%
8.41%
8.39%
% Difference
*All values in Table 6.3 are in seconds.

APPENDIX C

SESSION RESUMPTION TIMES

Session Resumption times for experimental runs under different loads and data sizes are
listed in Table C.1.
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Table C.1 Session Resumption Times*
2K

Clients
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
Average
% Difference

6K
10K
20K
200K
NoNoNoNo2-Server
2-Server
2-Server
2-Server
NO
2-Server
delegation
delegation
delegation
delegation
delegation
1.011
1.009
1.011
1.010
1.009
1.011
1.011
1.012
1.011
1.010

1.085
1.086
1.088
1.086
1.090
1.085
1.084
1.086
1.085
1.086

7.56%

*All values in Table 6.3 are in seconds.

1.018
1.012
1.016
1.016
1.012
1.016
1.016
1.014
1.017
1.015

7.56%

1.091
1.087
1.090
1.095
1.093
1.091
1.093
1.090
1.087
1.091

1.027
1.025
1.023
1.019
1.021
1.022
1.018
1.016
1.017
1.021

8.06%

1.103
1.099
1.096
1.095
1.110
1.102
1.101
1.103
1.102
1.101

1.076
1.033
1.064
1.045
1.045
1.049
1.044
1.044
1.047
1.050

14.14%

1.218
1.109
1.200
1.234
1.226
1.150
1.195
1.240
1.149
1.191

1.798
1.659
1.890
1.852
1.818
1.790
1.871
1.725
1.674
1.786

2.987
3.820
4.414
3.882
4.308
3.557
4.138
3.910
4.450
3.941

215.44%
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